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OSAT has undertaken a review and examination of some of the key sourcing and 
production issues raised by the industry's rapid globalization, seeking to identiij and 
quantify some initial parameters of these challenges. This effort was promptecl by a 
presentation at our 1997 Management Briefing Seminar by Peter Hellman, the president 
of TRW Automotive. Robert Bosch and Tenneco joined TRW in sponsoring the project, 
providing financial and substantive support for our efforts. We gratefully acknovvledge 
the unflagging, cheerful, and valuable advice and help of Messrs. Mark Davison (Bosch); 
Philip Dur and Richard Harris (Tenneco); and John Keogh (TRW). 
W. Van Bussmann of DaimlerChrysler, John Cope of Honda, Ronald Knox of General 
Motors, and Guido Scampa of Volkswagen all served on the project's Advisory ]Board. 
They provided thoughtful, well-considered reviews and discussion, and willingly gave us 
more time and support than we had initially expected. 
Of course, the authors accept full responsibility for any remaining errors of fact, analysis, 
or interpretation. 
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Executive Summary 
The end of the 2oth century finds the automotive industry undergoing massive expansion 
as its markets and production bases become truly global. Globalization raises significant 
risks for, and important strategic challenges to, companies throughout the entire industry 
value chain. The vehicle manufacturers drive much of the industry's globalization effort, 
as they target markets to pursue and develop strategies for providing vehicles through 
imports and local production. Local vehicle production strategies require decisions to 
import some parts and components and to source others locally, a strategy that often 
entails asking offshore suppliers to establish local facilities. 
Globalization challenges are particularly complex for automotive suppliers because their 
processes and economic situations often differ from the vehicle assemblers, as well as 
from one supplier to another. Suppliers' volume requirements cover a wide range, and 
are frequently higher than the scale for effective assembly activity. Moreover, suppliers 
find production sites differentially attractive because their ratios of capital and labor costs 
can vary widely. 
This report reviews the effects of differing constraints on sourcing/production decisions 
for a simulated car in a model world. Our car consists of three components, and 
competes in a world of seven countries. The components cover a wide range of capital 
investment, scale requirements, transportation costs, and tariff levels. The coclntries 
represent different size markets, growth potential, and access to regional markets. 
We modeled the comparative costs of building a new plant in each of six countries 
relative to two different base cases: the United States and Poland. Our modeling 
scenarios examine the effects of market growth, regional access, and plant scale. We 
examine these scenarios at the level of the individual component in each count~y, all 
three components within each country, and all three components across the seven-country 
world. Finally, we model the costs of building and supplying within the United States 
and Poland relative to the costs of building and supplying within the other seven 
countries. 
For suppliers, sourcing production from existing capacity in the United States is almost 
always less expensive than the local build option. However, the cost penalty associated 
with the build option varies substantially, both across components and across couintries. 
Moreover, the size of the penalty is quite sensitive to the volumes available to the local 
plant. Additionally, supplier distance is important for transportation costs, as well as 
reliable just-in-time delivery requirements. A "build-everything-everywhere" stxategy 
imposes a significant cost penalty relative to a strategy that relies upon component- and 
country-specific sourcing/local production optima. Finally, the costs of building and 
delivering locally vary, and a one-world price for supplier goods cannot be set at the 
minimum. 
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Introduction 
The North American industry today is substantially different from what it was just a few 
years ago, with the expanding operations of Japanese and German manufacturers, as well 
as suppliers from numerous nations, giving it a distinctly global cast. Moreover, the 
traditional industry is itself becoming more global, as long-established multinational 
companies strive to restructure themselves into better coordinated and truly global 
operations, while others take their first steps offshore toward a global future. 
Prospects for growth within the more mature automotive economies are quite limited. 
Competition within the industry has also increased, as both the marketplace and 
production base for motor vehicles have become more crowded, and more companies 
compete for shares of a slow-growth business. For manufacturers, it is more difficult to 
differentiate products from those of other assemblers, to achieve traditional scale 
economies, and to capture high customer loyalty. For suppliers, it is more difficult to 
balance customer portfolios across specific markets, vehicle segments, and product 
opportunities. This situation requires both manufacturers and suppliers to look to new 
markets around the globe. 
Globalization 
If established markets are slow-growth, becoming more crowded, and increasingly 
competitive, both manufacturers and suppliers will turn elsewhere, seeking the higher 
levels of production that permit them to capture scale economies and profit opportunities. 
And, indeed, that is exactly what has developed over the past decade, as manufacturers 
and their suppliers enter and expand across a range of more recently targeted, higher- 
growth automotive markets. 
These fresher markets typically have a relatively low density of motor vehicles and a 
large population base; economies and personal income levels experiencing rapid growth; 
and a developing automotive infrastructure, including retail distribution and service 
support networks, roadway systems, and, often, some vehicle and parts production. 
Expanding into these markets offers not only the potential of capturing share in a growing 
market, but it also provides some insurance against the fluctuations of established 
markets, and permits balancing activities across regions. A critical question for 
companies is whether to participate through imports, minimal manufacturing or 
assembly, or full-scale production. 
The combined resources required to support expansion efforts globally and to improve 
competitive performance in traditional markets are daunting, and, for most companies, 
demand record investment levels. For some companies, major decisions are becoming a 
common experience, as country after country becomes a target for automotive expansion, 
and resources must be deployed carefully and for maximum effectiveness. 
The continuing importance of scale economies in the automotive industry is suggested by 
the efforts of manufacturers to impose some level of design and production commonality 
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across their global products. Manufacturers are developing common, shared platforms 
(the chassis and underbody components) that can be economically adapted to meet 
variations in custome-r requirements and preferences. They also seek to increase sharing 
of components and subsystems throughout the vehicle, as well as across different mlodels. 
Suppliers pursue scale economies as well, including efforts to persuade their different 
assembler customers to purchase identical components in those areas that are invisible to 
the customer. 
An automotive manufacturer's ideal world would see common user requirements 
permitting the design and development of one vehicle, and the world's economic and 
policy environment supporting one assembly plant for worldwide distribution and 
consumption. However, the automotive market, the general economy, and policy 
dynamics will almost certainly prevent the development of this one-car, one-plant world. 
The automotive industry is an attractive source of economic development and job 
generation, and many governments are determined to ensure that their nations share and 
participate in the benefits from producing as well as from using motor vehicles. Nations 
use a variety of trade policies, rules, and regulations to capture automotive assembly 
plants and, in rarer instances, supplier plants as well. Conversely, tariffs, quotas, 
administrative actions, and required levels of domestic content are used to set nurr~erical 
ceilings on the number of imported vehicles permitted to enter a country. This often 
make it necessary to use locally produced supplier parts, components, and even 
subsystems, without regard to their price and quality. Various financial incentives, 
investment credits, and exemptions from taxes and other requirements effectively 
subsidize and encourage local capital investment. 
These government actions often distort the economic efficiency of the manufacturers' 
worldwide network of assembly plants, preventing them from siting plants where such 
plants would optimize the physical location and logistical requirements for supporting 
supplier factories and markets. Sometimes, primarily through domestic clontent 
restrictions, countries effectively require the siting of supplier plants in addition to 
assembly plants. And sometimes the manufacturers themselves require supporting 
supplier plants to locate where they site assembly plants. One of the problems that face 
suppliers is the substantially smaller level of resources they have for global investment 
compared with the manufacturers. Additionally, government grants that can suhlsidize 
investments and offset cost penalties are almost always granted to assemblers, and rarely 
to suppliers, even when the supplier's presence is an important share of the assembler's 
value to the host country. 
Once the hndamentals suggest an emerging market is at or near a take-off point-a 
decision often made 'with surprising unanimity among the manufacturers-assemblers 
begin to enter. Whether their strategy is "first-in" or a "fast-follower," suppliers that 
follow their customers to these markets are likely to be dependent on the success of those 
customers. But customer success may still yield production volumes insufficient to 
justify the suppliers' own investments and business risks. In some cases, even if the 
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supplier were to capture one hundred percent of the market, this would still not represent 
enough demand to offset the investment cost. 
A manufacturer's insistence that suppliers accompany it to new production sites appears 
to result from three concerns. First, manufacturers are trying to develop a truly 
worldwide supply base, at least among key suppliers, and prefer that such suppliers serve 
them wherever they have built assembly plants. Second, all the global manufacturers 
have now adopted major elements of just-in-time production, a manufacturing philosophy 
that calls for manufacturing efficiency and quality supported by low levels of inventory, 
emphasizing the importance of supplier proximity. Third, manufacturers are concerned 
about possible supply line interruption as those lines multiply, complicate, and lengthen. 
Of course, proximate supplier plants often simply move these risks to a different point in 
the supply and logistics system, as supplier-to-supplier logistics problems can ripple up 
through the supply chain. 
There is a fundamental and important question facing the industry as it globalizes and 
responds to the demands of markets and national production bases around the world: 
What is the most cost-effective way to supply the components demanded by the growing 
number of assembly plants worldwide? Given the rapid rate of industry expansion and 
the high investment it demands, this is a critical question. Moreover, this question must 
be answered at a system level, covering the entire automotive production chain, lest the 
optimum for one company or operation prove to be suboptimal for the entire system. 
There are four basic reasons why this challenge of cost-effective globalization is so 
critical, and why the way the industry and its participants respond to it will have profound 
effects on the automotive future: 
First, the cost of producing and delivering a motor vehicle, relative to the - 
average household income, is a critical determinant of the rate of expansion of 
the new and emerging markets. If costs exceed an optimal minimum, then 
market growth will slow, unless manufacturers choose to temporarily surrender 
profits or absorb losses until their operations become cost-efficient in that 
market. 
Second, developing duplicate industry production operations across 
numerous markets in a region risks seriously exceeding optimal worldwide 
capacity, resulting in a number of adverse capacity consequences. New, excess 
plants will run at less-than-optimal, efficient capacity, raising their own unit 
costs and, thus, the cost of vehicles. Moreover, they will almost surely prevent 
already-established plants from gaining production volumes, thus decreasing the 
efficiency of those already existing plants. 
Third, the business needs and operational situations of suppliers differ 
substantially from the manufacturers' assembly operations, and they also differ 
widely from one supplier to another. In particular, the composition of supplier 
production-related costs for capital equipment, materials, labor, and 
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transportation varies, and that means an attractive production site for a 
manufacturer or a particular supplier may be unattractive to another supplier. 
Thus, one decision model or rule for all supplier companies wou1.d be 
suboptimal. 
Fourth, the costs and risks of investments required for products in v;~rious 
markets vary widely. If these differences are ignored, companies may be put at 
serious risk, and the cumulative consequences of suboptimal system decisions 
across different markets are potentially extremely damaging to the entire supply 
chain. Consequently, it would also be suboptimal to use one decision model or 
rule for all markets. 
Analytic Models 
In order to evaluate the supplier build or import decision, we consider a sam~ple of 
components, markets, and possible plant sites that provide a range of comparative 
estimates. We analyze the costs associated with producing and supplying three different 
components, based on size, weight, and complexity, in seven countries representing the 
main regions of the world. We extrapolate these to evaluate the range of build and 
sourcing options available for supplying this "car" throughout its "world." The three 
components are fuel injectors, steering systems, and exhaust systems. (See Appendix 1) 
We chose these components because they vary widely in terms of required plant 
investment, labor content, tariff treatment, and transportation costs, providing ;a nice 
range of industry requirements. Our comparative estimates capture most of the cost 
factors and other considerations for supplying components, and we are confident the 
results hold reasonably well for many components supplied in most countries worldwide. 
We modeled three factors for these components, one reflecting capacity and two 
reflecting demand dimensions. First, we modeled two levels of plant scale or volume. 
Since most countries in the real world, and indeed many in our model world, have 
markets that would be oversupplied by the establishment of a full-scale production plant, 
we determined whether a reduced-scale plant would be a feasible alternative. Such a 
smaller scale plant might represent the more realistic possible alternative when 
determining whether to build or import. Second, we examined the effects of local market 
growth, projecting market sizes for 2002 based on growth through 1997. In most 
instances these projections are for quite aggressive growth. Third, we have also 
examined how optimal build/sourcing mixes would change if that seven-country world 
actually contained three regional trade associations, providing access to a larger potential 
market for some regional plants. 
We collected sales, production, import, and export data for 38 selected countries 
spanning six continents for our analysis of country, regional, and global trends. These 
countries include developed and developing economies, and vehicle markets of varying 
sizes. From this set of 38 countries we selected seven countries to serve as a model 
automotive world for the evaluation of the build/sourcing decisions throughout the report. 
Cars, Capacity, and Competition in the 21" Century 
These countries are Argentina, Germany, India, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, and the 
United States. (See Appendix 2) 
This model world has representatives from each major manufacturing region-North 
America, South America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, and Asia. 
Four of these countries also represent major regional trade associations-the North 
American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), the Common Market of the South or 
Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR), the European Union (EU), and the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
The seven countries do not represent our projection of today's-or tomorrow's-"hot" 
markets in automotive manufacturing and sales. Rather, the selection represents an 
attempt to identify countries where market interest is developing or automotive 
manufacturing investments are occurring, as well as a few markets where interest and 
investment have been more stable or predictable. 
Two separate sets of analyses are undertaken. One set of analyses uses an existing U S .  
plant as a base comparison, and the other set uses an existing Polish plant as the 
comparative base. This allows us to examine how our findings would be altered by the 
inclusion of a very large market in the model world. 
The model world includes both established and emerging economies, and the vehicle 
sales of its constituent countries are displayed in figure 1 below. The United States and 
Germany, the largest and third-largest markets in the world, are excluded from figure 1 
because their size compresses and obscures the data from the other five countries. 
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Figure 1: Model World Total Vehicle Sales 
The limits of our modeling work are clear: Its foundations are restricted to a three- 
component car and a seven-country world, and are therefore of uncertain generality. 
After all, it is an open question how closely these results apply across other materials, 
parts, components, or systems, or in other markets. Nor do our models permit the 
complex considerations characteristic of true system-based decisions. Finally, they do 
not reveal a new, one-strategy solution that fits all situations. Nevertheless, these model 
analyses do possess some unusual strengths. 
First, our component cost estimates are for the general industry, not for 
any one company, but they do reflect input from important suppliers of each 
component. We are therefore confident that these estimates of industry costs have a 
solid basis in reality, and are neither artificial nor arbitrary. 
Second, estimates of operating costs in different countries are based on 
industry cost data that are unusually accurate, rich, and detailed. Our sponsoring 
companies provided us with extensive information from their experiences, data that 
permits us to explore numerous models and comparisons of different mixes of 
options for buildlsource in these markets. 
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Third, the market scenarios that drive the production potentials in our 
model world are developed from extensive analysis of actual market and production 
data for 38 countries, spanning in most cases over 20 years. 
Fourth, we collected extensive information on the terms of trade and 
transportation costs for our three components and our 38-country sample. These 
permit us to incorporate these important factors into our buildlsource model 
comparisons in a much more realistic fashion than is generally the case. Tariffs 
across the components range from 0 percent in Mexico, to 21 percent in Argentina, 
while transportation costs range from just under 3 to just under 25 percent of 
production cost. (See Appendix 3) 
Fifth, our buildlsource model estimates include costs of maintaining an 
ample reserve for the sourcing case, inventory safety stocks that provide 
manufacturers assurance in a world of lengthened and less certain supply lines.' 
Sixth, we make generous assumptions about the potential of the 
investment in the alternative market. First, we assume that local plants will capture 
production equivalent to 50 percent of the available local market through a 
combination of local market share and production for export. Second, we assume 
continuing growth through 2002. These assumptions are quite lenient, making it 
more likely that a local plant can be justified. Hence, they are conservative in 
evaluating the relative attractiveness of the sourcing option, and biased, if at all, to 
the build option. 
Seventh, we focus on a series of comparisons between the base 
comparison cases, Poland and the United States, and other markets for reasons of 
space. However, since all these comparisons are to this common base, the 
interested reader may use them to compare directly any other two countries of 
interests2 
Eighth, these analyses can be expanded to incorporate more components 
and more countries. This is useful for augmenting the analysis's coverage, as well 
as assessing the reliability and generality of our current results. 
We believe that these models reflect accurate data for many factors that must usually be 
assumed. This decreased reliance on assumptions makes these analyses extremely useful 
and largely compensates for any shortcomings in scope, weaknesses that are, in any case, 
common to such modeling efforts. 
- -- 
1 These safety stock costs are estimated for inventory sufficient to cover a surge in production two standard 
deviations above the expected level for a period of time that would permit adjusting production and 
delivering the higher required levels from the United States or Poland. 
2 The base case assumes existing capacity, and therefore does not include capital cost estimates. However, 
since capital costs are included in all other country estimates, and each is compared to the base as a 
common referent, bilateral comparisons of these countries can yield direct comparisons of their costs of 
local production. Of course, advantages reported in the figures will have to be converted to the appropriate 
percent of base costs. That is, an advantage of 25 percent is a cost level of 75 percent of the base cost level. 
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Generally, each case should be assessed individually and an optimal sourcing decision 
should be based on that assessment. For instance, this could mean that it is unwise for a 
supplier to build within a particular country, due to insufficient market size. If, however, 
the supplier were to supply the region, effectively increasing the market size, then the 
decision to build a new plant could become optimal. 
Results 
The results of the modeling work are reported in a series of four numerical measures that 
summarize a number of relevant comparisons. Measure One compares the cost of 
providing components for local vehicle assembly from a capacity-available existing plant 
in the United States or Poland with the costs of building a local supply plant. This 
comparison expresses the cost of local sourcing as a percent above (local penalty) or 
below (local advantage) providing the component from the existing plant. This is the 
traditional comparison for evaluating the buildlsource decision. 
Measure Two compares the total costs of building all three components in the local 
nmum. market with building or sourcing them on a component-specific, low-cost opt" 
Measure two will either indicate a cost disadvantage, or be equal to zero, because the 
build everywhere (suboptimal) cost disadvantage will always be greater than or equal to 
the build/source (optimal) cost disadvantage. 
Measure Three sums the total cost penalties and advantages in building all three 
components across all seven countries in the model world. This measure effectively 
suggests the penalties associated with a build everywhere approach relative to each 
component supplier selecting its own optimal arrangements for each country. 
Measure Four compares the cost of supplying the component for domestic assembly in 
two markets. It compares the lower cost buildlsource alternative for supplying the new 
market with the cost of building the component in an existing plant (U.S. or Polish) and 
sold in the same country. This comparison expresses the cost of providing the component 
in a new market as a percent above (local penalty) or below (local advantage) the cost of 
supplying the component within a country with an established plant. 
We present our findings for two different base plants, one in Poland arid one in the 
United States. When we use the U S .  plant as the comparison base, Poland is included as 
an alternative production site and market. Conversely, when the Polish plant is used as 
the base, the United States becomes one of the six alternative sites and markets. 
Figure 2, displays the penaltyladvantage of sourcing components fkom the U.S. plant to 
support each of the other six countries (including Poland) in the model world, cornpared 
with building these components in a full-scale plant in each country. A full-scale plant 
can be justified only in the case of Germany and India for component A, assuming there 
is available capacity in the United States for all three components. For component A, 
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local build in Argentina is virtually a tie with sourcing from the United States, with a 
relatively trivial direct penalty (well under 1 percent) for establishing a full-scale plant. 
M a r k e t s  ( U . S .  B a s e )  
Figure 2: Cost of Local Build versus U.S. Sourcing (1997 Full-Scale Plant, U.S. Base) 
Additionally, figure 2 illustrates three important points. First, sourcing from the United 
States is the best alternative in 16 of the 18 comparisons, with one comparison essentially 
a tie. Germany is the alternative closest to the U.S. cost level for each of the three 
components, and probably would be the next most attractive source in most two-country 
comparisons as welL3 So the developed markets are more attractive sources than 
conventional wisdom might suggest. Second, the cost penalties associated with local 
production rather than sourcing from existing capacity are often quite large. Third, the 
relative costs of local production compared to U.S. sourcing vary greatly across these 
countries and components, highlighting the need for careful case-by-case evaluation of 
the build/source option. 
Making the direct comparisons discussed in the prior footnote does reveal, in a Poland base example, that 
Germany is the low cost production location for all three of these components. This primarily reflects the 
production scale its large market can support. If we subtract capital costs from these estimates-to reflect 
existing capacity-and if we add the necessary tariff and transportation costs, Germany might even be a 
lower-cost source than the United States for some of the other markets. 
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M a r k e t s  ( P o l a n d  B a s e )  
Figure 2A: Cost of Local Build versus Sourcing from Poland (1997 Full-Scale Plant, Polish Rase) 
In figure 2A we use the existing Polish plant as the comparison base and substitute the 
United States for Poland as one of the alternative possible plant sites in our model world. 
Five markets experience cost differentials similar to those observed in figure 2. 
However, when we compare the U.S. cost penalty for building a new plant in figure 2A 
with the Polish penalty in figure 2, we find the U.S. penalties are much smaller. This is 
due to its vastly larger market. In fact, component A should be produced for the U.S. 
supplier market in a new U.S. facility rather than sourced from an existing plant in 
Poland. The cost penalty for building components C and F in Germany are somewhat 
higher compared with an existing Polish plant than when compared with a U.S. plant, 
reflecting Germany's proximity to Poland. This minimizes the transportation costs for 
sourcing from Poland, and thus raises the penalty for a new plant in Germany. 
Our comparisons are influenced by two critical factors, the investment level and recovery 
period required for the new plant, and the production scale available to it. In fact, the 
differing comparisons against a Polish and a U.S. base described above highlight their 
importance, as they outweigh important differences between Poland and the United. States 
in labor costs, transportation, and tariffs. 
Is there an option of building a plant that requires lower investment, either because its 
capacity is reduced or its operations are structured differently, perhaps to take advantage 
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of lower labor costs in the emerging markets? To be sure, such process alterations may 
threaten quality and standardization achieved through the introduction of more capital- 
intense, automated production; but they might lower costs. Moreover, in growing 
markets, today's plant volumes may well be lower than they would be in the future, and 
surely decisions on capacity should reflect this contingency. 
Figure 3 presents the U.S, plant as the existing comparison base, while Poland is one of 
the alternative possible sites for a new plant. In figure 3A, the Polish plant is treated as 
the existing comparison base, while the United States is treated as one of the alternative 
possible sites for new plant investment. They display the differences in the comparison 
of costs for full- and reduced-scale plants, projected for a larger 2002 market. Here we 
average the three components, rather than showing each separately, in order to illustrate 
better the key summary point. Indeed, the combination of reduced-scale plants and larger 
production volumes can sharply lower the cost enalties associated with local production, 
but many of these penalties remain substantial. ,P 
M a r k e t s  ( U . S .  B a s e )  
Figure 3: Cost of Local Build versus U.S. Sourcing (2002 Full-ScaleIReduced Scale Plants, U.S. Base) 
4 In the 18 component-by-country comparisons with the US, base, seven of the cases justify a local 
reduced-scale plant for 2002, on the basis of cost. 
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M a r k e t s  ( P o l a n d  B a s e )  
Figure 3A: Cost of Local Build versus Sourcing from Poland 
(2002 Full-ScalelReduced Scale Plants, Polish Base) 
Recall that the growth estimates for these countries are rather aggressive. Because of 
this, even full-scale new plants enjoy reduced penalties as production volumes grow over 
time, as shown in figures 4 and 4A. Figure 4 presents the U.S. plant as the existing 
comparison base, while Poland is one of the alternative possible sites for a new plant. In 
figure 4A, the Polish plant is treated as the existing comparison base, while the 'United 
States is treated as one of the alternative possible sites for new plant investment. Market 
growth alone justifies just two additional new plants above the 1997 level of two, already 
displayed in figure 2. 
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M a r k e t s  ( u . s .  B a s e )  
Figure 4: Cost of Local Build versus U.S. Sourcing (199712002 Full-Scale Plant, U.S. Base) 
M a r k e t s  ( p o l a n d  B a s e )  
Figure 4A: Cost of Local Build versus Sourcing from Poland 
(1997/2002 Full-scale Plant, Polish Base) 
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Supplier and assembler markets can expand through mechanisms other than growth, and 
one of the most intriguing is the possibility of expanding or opening regional trade areas, 
such as ASEAN and NAFTA. Figure 5 presents the U.S, plant as the existing comparison 
base, while Poland is one of the alternative possible sites for a new plant. In figure 5A, 
the Polish plant is treated as the existing comparison base, while the United Sta,tes is 
treated as one of the alternative possible sites for new plant investment. They display the 
coilsequences of access to larger regional markets for three of our sample developing 
industries, Argentina, Mexico, and the Philippines. These graphs compare the cost 
advantages and penalties of building the three components in already larger 2002 national 
markets, from figures 4 and 4A, with the penalties and advantages that each country 
experiences with access to the larger markets of its regional trade associations. The 
results are dramatic, as the penalties for local production are reduced by an order of 
magnitude. Still, the penalties remain substantial. To be sure, this model assumes that 
the plants can capture 50 percent of the available regional market, effectively requiring 
that most of the other countries in the region are not also establishing competing supplier 
plants.5 
W N  a t i o n a l  
M E R C O S U R  N A F T A  A S E A N  
M a r k e t s  ( U . S .  B a s e )  
Figure 5: Cost of Regional Build versus U.S. Sourcing (2002 Full-Scale Plant, U.S. Base) 
This assumption may not be realistic. In particular, it is not likely that many Mexican supplier plants will 
capture 50 percent of the NAFTA region, if only because US.-based and Canadian-based suppliers are 
likely to compete strongly for these sales. 
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M E R C O S U R  K A F T A  A S E A N  
M a r k e t s  ( P o l a n d  B a s e )  
Figure 5A: Cost of Regional Build versus Sourcing from Poland (2002 Full-scale Plant, Polish Base) 
The above models compare the build/source options for each component for each 
individual market, although we typically display the average of the three components. 
These models indicate that the potential cost penalties for the build versus the source 
option can be quite high, especially when plant scale grossly exceeds the market demand. 
We turn now to our second measure to compare the total costs of building all three 
components in the local market with building or sourcing them on a component-specific, 
low-cost optimum. 
In this next group of models, we compare the total cost of our three-component vehicle 
built with combined optimal build/source mix with the costs of a completely local-build 
strategy. If sourcing fiom an existing plant is the optimal solution for any of the three 
components, then this measure will be positive, indicating the degree of penalty of a 
local-build strategy for each market. If building locally is the optimal solution for all 
three components, then this measure becomes zero. 
Figure 6 includes the new Polish plant and the U.S. base plant, while figure 6A includes 
the U S ,  alternative plant and the Polish base plant. They each display the costs of 
building all three components in a new local plant with the cost of supplying each by its 
own best alternative, be that sourcing from an existing plant or building locally. 
Establishing a full-scale plant for each of these three components in any of these 
countries, compared with sourcing from the United States or Poland, involves a cost 
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penalty at 1997 market levels. To be sure, it varies from less than 10 percent in Germany 
to well over 150 percent in the Philippines. But the penalty is important, even in the best 
of cases. 
M a r k e t s  ( U . S . B a s e )  
Figure 6: Cost of Local Build All versus Optimum Mix (1997 Full Scale Plant, U.S. Base) 
M a r k e t s  ( P o l a n d  B a s e )  
Figure 6A: Cost of Local Build All versus Optimum Mix (1997 Full Scale Plant, Polish Base) 
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Again, the option of building reduced-scale plants can reduce investment levels and thus, 
combined with some level of market growth, attenuate the cost penalty. These results for 
2002 are displayed in figure 7, which includes the Polish alternative and a U.S, base plant 
and figure 7A, which includes the U.S. alternative new plant and the Polish base plant. 
Again, there is great variation across these countries, as the choice of a full- or reduced- 
scale plant matters little in Germany, where the full-scale plants are operating at a cost- 
efficient utilization rate, but matters greatly in the Philippines where full-scale plants will 
run well below their capacity. If the reduced scale option is still not an attractive one, at 
least it is less costly than requiring full-scale plants, although it might sometimes reduce 
product quality and undercut global standardization efforts. It may even be an attractive 
option, if, for example, local content requirements demand establishing some supplier 
activity. 
M a r k e t s  ( U . S .  B a s e )  
Figure 7: Cost of Local Build All versus Optimum Mix 
(2002 Full-Scale/Reduced-Scale Plants, U.S. Base) 
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RI a r k e t s  ( P o l a n d  B a s e )  
Figure 7A: Cost of Local Build All versus Optimum Mix 
(2002 Full-ScalelReduced-Scale Plants, Polish Base) 
Figure 8 includes the Polish alternative new plant and the U.S. base plant, while figure 
8A includes the U.S. alternative and the Polish base plant. They indicate that market 
growth alone, even under optimistic scenarios, will not justify building full-scale plants 
for all three components in any of these markets. Additionally, local build strategies still 
impose heavy penalties, except in the case of Germany, where the penalties are lighter. 
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M a r k e t s  ( U . S .  B a s e )  
Figure 8: Cost of Local Build All versus Optimum Mix (199712002 Full-Scale Plant, U.S. Base) 
M a r k e t s  ( P o l a n d  B a s e )  
Figure 8A: Cost of Local Build All versus Optimum Mix (1997/2002 Full-Scale Plant, Polish Base) 
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Figure 9 presents the U.S. plant as the existing comparison base, while Poland is one of 
the alternative possible sites for a new plant. In figure 9A, the Polish plant is treated as 
the existing comparison base, while the United States is treated as one of the alternative 
possible sites for new plant investment. These figures show that if we combine national 
market growth with wider access to trade area markets, the penalties of a local build 
strategy diminish drastically. This is not surprising, because the local build strategy for 
each of the individual components becomes more viable and attractive. However, the 
remaining penalty is still not negligible, although just below 1.5 percent in the case of 
Mexico, a member of NAFTA. Similarly in figure 9A, the cost penalties of building a 
new plant for the Argentine market alone, compared with sourcing from an existing 
Polish plant, are much higher than they are for an Argentine plant serving the 
MERCOSUR market. 
M E R C O S U R  N A F T A  A S E A N  
M a r k e t s  ( U . S .  B a s e )  
Figure 9: Cost of Local Build All versus Optimum Mix (2002 Full-Scale Plant, U.S. Base) 
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M a r k e t s  ( P o l a n d  B a s e )  
Figure 9A: Cost of Local Build All versus Optimum Mix (2002 Full-Scale Plant, Polish Base) 
One variant of globalization calls for the automotive industry to establish a production 
base in numerous, if not all, national markets. The demands of governments rather than 
economics would drive such an outcome, as governments try to capture the economic 
benefits of automotive production. Our third measure sums up the total cost penalties 
and advantages in building all three components across all seven countries in the model 
world. This measure effectively suggests the penalties associated with a build- 
everywhere approach compared with each component supplier selecting its own optimal 
arrangements within each country. 
The cross-hatched bar of figure 10, representing the scenario that includes the Polish 
alternative and the U.S. base plant, suggests that the penalty for a build-everything- 
everywhere strategy is substantial, costing in excess of 20 percent more than an optimal 
buildlsource strategy for full-scale plants in 1997. The solid bar shows the importance of 
market size, as national market growth and access to regional markets again sharply 
reduce the penalty of this strategy, to just under 4 percent6 The other scenarios are again 
6 Of course, there is a practical inconsistency in this model. Clearly, a build-everywhere strategy contains 
an important internal flaw: Building everywhere effectively limits the option of seeking scale economies 
through access to larger and larger regional markets, because these regions would be unlikely to develop in 
a world where every national market is tied to a local industry. Logically, build-everywhere strategies have 
limits. However, our model world reflects this, because we test a limited and realistic "everywhere." 
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intermediate. National market growth through 2002 cuts the penalty by somewhat less 
than 25 percent, while reduced investment lowers it by about half, still leaving a 
substantial penalty. 
M a r k e t s  ( U . S .  B a s e )  
Figure 10: Cost of Build All, Everywhere versus Optimum Mix 
(1997 National12002 Regional Full-Scale Plants, U.S. Base) 
Figure 10A represents the U.S. alternative and the Polish base plant. The cross-hatched 
bar indicates that the cost penalty for building all components everywhere, is just over 10 
percent at 1997 national market levels. However, the solid bar indicates that the cost 
penalty is reduced slightly, to just below 10 percent, with the growth available through 
2002 and with wider regional market access for some new plants. This relatively narrow 
gap in cost penalties reflects the inclusion of the U.S. market in 10A, and its exclusion in 
figure 10. In the Polish base example, figure 10A, total national market size is 21 rnillion 
units, increasing to a regional 38-million-unit market, not quite doubling the size of the 
market. However in the U.S. base example, the national markets total just 6 rnillion 
units, increasing to a 38-million-unit regional market-a more than six-fold increase. 
These results point out that expanding from a national market strategy to a regional 
strategy can capture reductions in cost penalties, but other factors, such as base plant 
location, also affect the size of the penalties. 
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M a r k e t s  ( P o l a n d  B a s e )  
Figure IOA: Cost of Build All, Everywhere versus Optimum Mix 
(1997 National12002 Regional Full-Scale Plants, Polish Base) 
A separate, but important, question raised by globalization is whether or not a tmly 
worldwide price is an attainable goal, or just an artificial demand imposed by the 
assemblers. Our final measure compares the cost of supplying the component in two 
markets. It compares the lower cost build/source alternative for supplying the new 
market with the cost of U.S. production for the U.S. market. This comparison expresses 
the cost of providing the component in a new market as a percentage above (local 
penalty) or below (local advantage) the cost of supplying the component in the United 
States from the established U.S. plant. Since such costs are rarely identical, it is important 
to keep decisions about pricing anchored in a local or global context rather than a one- 
country-fits-all approach. 
Figure 11 displays cost penalties or advantages for alternative new plants compared with 
those of a U.S. plant, with each plant supplying its own market. Figure 11A displays the 
same comparisons against a Polish plant, with similar results. Note that in 17 of 18 cases 
the cost of building and delivering the product in the United States is lower than the cost 
of building and delivering the products in other markets. To be sure, this does not mean 
that the United States is the optimal source for all 17 component markets, since this 
estimate does not include tariff and transportation costs for delivering the product to other 
markets. When we look at the effects of investment levels, national market growth, and 
regional market access, we see the same patterns observed in our other measures. These 
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results suggest that a true global price must reflect some realistic average, since suppliers 
cannot deliver at the low price of any one market on a worldwide basis. 
M a r k e t s  (U . S .  B a s e )  
Figure 11: Cost Comparison: Local Bui1dK.S. Build (1997 Full-Scale Plant, U.S. Base) 
M a r k e t s  ( P o l a n d  B a s e )  
Figure 11A: Cost Comparison: Local BuildIPolish Build (1997 Full-Scale Plant, Polish Base) 
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Conclusions 
These model evaluations suggest a number of important considerations. First, we must 
stress again that each of these components and each of these local markets are quite 
different in important respects. While there are overall similarities, actual decisions must 
be made carefully, reflecting each individual component and market under consideration. 
One of the key factors in the build/source evaluation is the transportation cost associated 
with sourcing from existing capacity. Shipping the products from existing capacity 
elsewhere is a key differentiator among these components and makes a substantial 
difference in the potential cost penalties for building a suboptimal plant. For example, 
component A might reasonably be built in three of these national markets, and pays a 
severe cost penalty for local production in only one. Component F pays penalties that 
might be justifiable in two markets, while component C pays horrendous penalties in all 
national markets and clearly requires access to a regional market for it to have any chance 
of reasonable-cost local build. 
Market proximity to the base plant, in combination with the shipping costs, also affects 
the buildlsource decision. For example, in our model world, the Polish plant is much 
closer to its nearest foreign market, Germany, than is the U S .  plant to its closest foreign 
market, Mexico. As the distance between base plant and market increases, shipping costs 
increase as well. In our model, the decision to build a new plant necessitates the recovery 
of all investment costs through sales of the manufactured product, oftentimes driving the 
new-plant unit cost well above the cost of importing the product. Thus, when deciding 
whether to build in a new market or source from existing capacity, low unit shipping 
costs could render a decision to build suboptimal. 
Second, an important difference in the situation of manufacturers and suppliers is the 
liltelihood of manufacturers receiving subsidies of some kind that help offset their 
investment costs. The sourcelbuild comparisons and calculations can change sharply 
when an important element, such as capital costs, is substantially reduced through such 
grants by a country that strongly desires the manufacturer's presence. This obviously 
changes the decision process for those manufacturers who receive these subsidies. 
Third, building volumes is quite important to suppliers, since many have relatively 
capital-intense processes that require large production volumes for investment recovery. 
National market growth by itself will not have much effect on the size of the penalty; 
access to broader regional markets, combined with no additional national production 
bases in the region, may be critical for many local industries. 
Fourth, developing reduced-scale plants can lower the cost penalty, but can involve some 
risks to uniform quality and global standardization. Reduced-scale plants probably make 
sense when they reflect smaller plants, fewer lines, and such, but probably make less 
sense if they require change in the fundamental production processes. 
Fifth, the penalties associated with a strategy of building everything in a local market, 
and its extension to building everything everywhere, are far from trivial. In fact, for 
2002, the countries range from an 8 percent penalty in Germany to a penalty over 70 
Cars, Capacity, and Competition in the 21'' Century 
percent in the Philippines (over 80 percent in the Philippines using the Polish base 
scenario). Penalties in three of the countries are about 30 percent higlier than the costs of 
an optimal build/source mix strategy. This strategy imposes a penalty of over 22 percent 
in 1997, and this remains above 17 percent with strong market growth through 2002. 
When the Polish base example is used, the results, and implications, are similar. In two 
of the countries, the cost penalties are 30 percent or higher than the optimal build/source 
mix strategy. As with the U.S, base example, in no country are the cost penalties less 
than 8 percent. 
Sixth, the results clearly imply adverse consequences for low capacity utilization. A 
major reason that plants in these countries experience high costs is that thery are 
functioning at low capacity-utilization rates. One of the basic assumptions of our model 
is that new-plant investment will be recovered through product sales over the life of the 
plant. We find that building a plant in the United States incurs smaller per-unit cost 
penalties than does building a comparable plant in Poland. Due to the greater size of the 
U.S. market and the likelihood that the U S .  plant would run near full capacity, the 
average price per unit will be kept at a minimum. A plant in Poland, however, would be 
underutilized, driving up the average per-unit price. Moreover, new capacity pressures 
old capacity, and may reduce capacity utilization in existing plants. To be sure, assessing 
the indirect effects of new capacity in harming the efficiency of older plants elsewhere in 
the world requires careful assessment of capacity for each market and component. 
Nevertheless, for a variety of human and organizational reasons, it is not unheard of for 
companies to favor newer plants in product and volume allocation. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to be concerned that low levels of utilization in newer plants would lead to 
shifting of volumes to them from established plants elsewhere. 
Seventh, extending these results of our three-component car in a seven-market world to 
an entire car in the real world paints a grim scenario indeed. These results suggest that the 
cost penalties associated with these local production strategies are sufficient to restrain 
market growth. Moreover, the cost discipline that overseas production can impose on 
existing plants may evaporate if the production cost is high because the local markets are 
too small to support efficient operations. 
Implications 
There is little doubt that the industry must make more complex production siting and 
sourcing decisions as it globalizes. Strategies must respect and reflect the differrences 
between component production and vehicle assembly, while also recognizing the great 
variation in the processes and economics of component production. The challenge is to 
minimize the total vehicle cost, and that is difficult when training and tradition call for 
optimizing at the level of the plant, company, or component, rather than the total system. 
It is important that assemblers be cautious and not simply mimic each other's component 
sourcing/build strategies. The risk here is that such duplication will almost certai~ily put 
multiple suppliers at risk, because what constitutes healthy competition in larger markets 
becomes suicidal in smaller markets. 
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Successful companies will integrate the component- and country-specific advantages and 
disadvantages across their value chain into a cost-optimized vehicle. This certainly 
requires complex and adaptable strategies that can be tailored to the relevant situations 
and circumstances, rather than a unitary and rigid formula. For example, requiring a 
component A plant in the Philippines would be patently foolish in our model world, but 
could well happen if an assembler applies rather simple strategies of demanding 
proximate supply plants for reasons of supply security or meeting requirements for local 
content. 
It may be that the industry should develop models of pooling and sharing the decisions, 
risks, and costs of investments required for a particular product in a specific market. 
Perhaps such pooling strategies might also apply to the incentives and subsidies that 
governments provide, but usually to the assemblers alone. On occasion, some suppliers 
are included in early stage discussions regarding tax credits, and expanding this practice 
to more suppliers and to more incentives would permit such sharing. It seems sensible to 
explore ways to share risks that might otherwise concentrate in one or a few companies, 
putting their contribution to the value chain at risk. The consequences of suboptimal 
system decisions are potentially too damaging to concentrate the risks in just one 
company. 
Developing regional component-supply strategies should be a priority for both 
manufacturers and suppliers. Not all of the industry's decisions on plant siting are under 
its own control. However, even in the case of domestic content requirements, there can 
be an element of choice or selection as to what the exact mix of sourcingibuilding will be, 
as well as to what the exact distribution of component activity will be across nations and 
within regions. In these cases, the penalties should be minimized, and careful evaluation 
of which components will be sourced and which manufactured locally can at least restrict 
the cost penalties imposed by such requirements. 
There are shared-risk strategies appropriate to these situations. For example, an OEM 
might ask its suppliers to distribute their individual local production commitments across 
a region so that each company builds one plant, and the regional market can provide scale 
economies. Properly planned, such a strategy could meet local content requirements, 
while taking into account the individual cost and risks to each supplier. 
The selection of which suppliers should accompany an assembler to which markets must 
reflect more than their size, vehicle content level, and local preferences. Clearly, the cost 
penalties or advantages of local production compared with sourcing from established 
facilities should be among the factors considered, and a major one at that. 
APPEDIX 1: PRODUCTION COST DATA 
Company Cost Data 
Our analysis of optimal sourcing began with a collection of industry-generalized micro 
data which, when input into our model, yields component-specific results, and becomes 
the base of our automobile cost analysis. General industry data for each type of 
component was requested from the sponsoring companies. A short survey, and 
subsequent follow-up survey, was the primary data-gathering instrument for variables 
such as fixed costs, variable costs, transportation costs, plant investment, plant life, and 
plant scale. This last input, plant scale, turns out to be an important consideration. Many 
countries in the world, and indeed most in our model, represent markets that would be 
oversupplied if a full-scale production plant went online. We consequently requested 
each sponsoring company to consider whether a reduced-scale plant would be built in a 
small market. Our research indicated that a smaller scale plant would more accurately 
represent the cost considerations of an actual build or import decision. All three 
companies were able to supply the necessary data to complete this reduced-scale 
scenario. Additionally, personal discussions with sponsor representatives are conducted 
to ascertain the accuracy of the input data for the model. 
APPENDIX 2: 38 COUNTRY DATA SET 
COUNTRY DATA 
38 Country Sample 
We selected thirty-eight countries spanning six continents to comprise the data set 
including the use of economic models and country, regional, and global trends in this 
report. These countries include developed and developing economies, and various scale 
markets for vehicles. We collected sales, production, import, and export figures for these 
countries from 1978 to 1998 but, due to problems of availability of data in many of these 
markets, have employed 1986 through 1998 data in our models. 
Data sources include industry publications, national trade associations, and domestic 
government sources for each of the countries. The three main industry publications relied 
upon in forming the data set include Ward's Automotive Yearbook, Automotive News 
Market Data Book, and American Automobile Manufacturers Association 's World Motor 
Vehicle Data. Other industry sources include The Economist Intelligence Unit, and 
Automotive International and Automotive News Europe, both publications of Automotive 
News. Examples of contributing trade associations include the VDA (German 
Association of the Motor Industry), Society of Motor Manufacturers Trade (United 
Kingdom), ANFIA (Italian association of automotive manufacturers and tier-one 
suppliers), ABEIVA (Brazilian Association of Automotive Vehicles Import Companies), 
KAMA (Korean Automotive Manufacturers Association), and JETRO (Japanese External 
Trade Organization). Government sources include the National Trade Data Bank (the 
United States and Foreign Commercial Service) and embassies, consular offices, and 
bureaus of statistics, economics, trade, industry, and transportation. In addition, the three 
project sponsors were extremely helpful in the data collection process. 
The annual sales and production figures represented in the models are typically an 
average of the three ltey industry publications, depending on availability. Whenever 
possible, these figures have been compared and verified with data provided by official 
government sources. The annual import and export figures include contributions from 
the government sources and trade associations, as well as the industry publications. 
COUNTRY SELEC'TION 
From the set of 38 countries we selected 7 countries to serve as cases throughout the 
models and report. The 7 cases include both developed and developing economies, as 
well as various market sizes within these categories. Four of the countries represent 
major trade regions, which were examined in the models to ascertain the effects of a 
larger market on costs. 
In the models, we have chosen to illustrate the results by country for the 7 countries, and 
then by trade agreement for the 4 trade regions. We believe that this better portrays the 
tendency of today's trade patterns to divide into inter- and intra-regional trade. Regional 
trade associations especially offer incentives for neighboring countries to engage in trade; 
such incentives often include lower tariffs, easing of non-tariff barriers, and the 
possibility of relationship building between nations. This is particularly true for 
manufacturing investments in developing economies. Developing economies tend to 
have higher tariff and non-tariff barriers than developed markets, yet may offer attractive 
incentives to produce and participate in their domestic markets. On the other hand, it is 
important to note that regional trade associations in general, including those represented 
in this report, have 3-, 5- or 10- year schedules to reduce tariffs and facilitate trade with 
nonmember countries. This leads us to believe that in the future, trade associations will 
become less important as their external trade barriers are gradually reduced due to 
continuing pressure from nonmember countries for fieer trade. It is possible for the long- 
term trend toward diminishing tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and local content requirements 
to continue. 
Uncertainty and Variability of Global Markets 
We used peak-to-trough and trough-to-peak analysis to measure the volatility in a country 
market or regional market in a specific time period. These calculations, for instance, 
identified a one-year 37 percent decline in vehicle sales in Thailand in 1996 to 1997 and 
an 89 percent average increase in vehicle sales over the 1986-1989 period in the 
Philippines. These calculations are of particular concern for developing markets that are 
more volatile, on average, from developed markets due to market size and rate of growth. 
We also calculated compound growth rates using 12 years of data to measure the 
variability of these markets. The compound growth rates enable us to estimate the speed 
at which the markets are changing. For example, the growth rate over the 1986 to 1997 
time period in Malaysia is a positive 16 percent compared to a negative 9.5 percent in 
France. 
Employing the compound growth rates for each individual country, we are able to demonstrate 
one possible scenario for future markets by estimating the potential size of the markets for the 
next five years. These projections are linear and are based on data through 1997. 
Vehicle  Sales in India 
Y e a r s  
In order to illustrate the interaction between the variability of the market and the 
uncertainty of the projections even further, we have selected several base years for 
growth and subsequent projection calculations for a single market. For example, in 
figure A-1, we calculated three separate growth rates for Mexico using 1994, 1995, and 
1997 data to illustrate how dramatically expectations can vary for a given market. The 
decrease in 1995 sales was due to the late 1994 crash of the Mexican peso. 
$h exico Average  Annual  Vehicle Sales Projections 
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Figure A-1: Mexican Sales Projections Using Different Base Years 
These calculations demonstrate the difficulty in accurately projecting future market size. 
Nevertheless, the kinds of projections are necessary to determine the scope and scale of 
investment in a market, region, or the problems of global strategy. 
APPENDIX 3: TRADE ISSUES 
Tariffs and Other Duties 
Tariffs information is drawn from a number of sources, most of which give fragmentary 
and incomplete rate data. The National Trade Data Bank (NTDB), maintained by the 
Department of Commerce and available on the World Wide Web, is organized by 
country. Data for most countries have been updated during the last twelve months, but in 
a few cases data were last updated in 1995. Under each country a subsection "Trade 
Regulations and Standards" (TR&S) contains a very general discussion of tariffs, with 
limited rate data. Rates are often expressed as averages across all products (including 
agricultural products) and are therefore of limited usefulness. 
Within the NTDB for some countries, there is a section on "Automobiles and Automotive 
Parts" or "Automotive Spare Parts and Accessories." In these, a subsection on "Market 
Access" (MA) contains, in some cases, specific tariff rates for automotive parts, which is 
useful if the tariff rate is uniform across types of components. 
The WavdWembertons World Auto Atlas and Directory, 1998 (W) contains general 
tariff rates for built-up (BU) and knocked-down (KD) vehicle imports for the major 
trading counties of the world. In a few cases, specific tariff rates are given for automotive 
component imports. Where component rates are not provided, KD rates are assumed to 
be applicable to component rates. 
For Pacific-rim counties that are members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
Agreement, up-to-date tariff rates by Harmonized System (HS) codes are provided in a 
Web-database at www.apectariff.org. From this database, it was possible to identify 
specific tariffs applicable to fuel injection systems, muffler and exhaust systems, and 
steering systems. 
In addition to tariffs, information on other duties was also collected from the ;above 
sources. These other duties include value-added taxes, import quotas and licenses, trade 
balancing and foreign exchange requirements, local content requirements, restrictions of 
foreign investment and controls on profit repatriation, and export and foreign investment 
subsidies. 
TERMS OF TRADE 
Historically, all nations have sought to manage external trade by erecting a variety of 
barriers to trade and investment with other nations, to protect special interests within their 
own economy, and to raise revenue for the general treasury. The principal protection and 
revenue source has been taxes applied to the value of imported goods (tariffs or tluties, 
together with port taxes, customs processing fees, etc.). Occasionally, exports have also 
been taxed, largely to raise revenue. There also have been a variety of non-tariff barriers, 
including import quotas, trade-balancing requirements, foreign-exchange restrictions, 
local-content requirements, and restrictions on foreign investment and related dividend 
repatriation. 
In addition to restricting trade, some nations have sought to stimulate trade by subsidizing 
foreign investment and exports, both largely because of their positive effects on job 
creation. 
Whether we consider protection, subsidies, or both, these measures affect and distort 
investment and production decisions for automobile assemblers and parts manufacturers, 
because they alter the basic economic parameters of these decisions. They must be 
quantified to the extent possible and incorporated in the models being used in this study. 
In recent years, the various negotiating rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) have tended to standardize the terms of trade, eliminate non-tariff barriers, 
lower the level of tariffs, and provide for enforcement mechanisms and remedies for 
violations through the World Trade Organization (WTO). GATT has also attempted to 
reduce subsidies, but it is unclear how much progress has been made. 
The growth of regional trade associations, such as the European Customs Union, the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) Agreement in South America, and the nascent Asia Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA) in Southeast Asia, operate within the fi-amework of GATT. In most 
cases, regional trade areas are seen as complementary to GATT, resulting in faster 
progress in liberalizing trade than would be possible under GATT alone, although there 
may be exceptions. Regional association tend to result in diminished tariffs within the 
trade areas, eventually reaching zero, for goods produced within the trade area with 
sufficient local content to qualify as "locally produced." They also provide for 
standardized external tariffs for goods that do not qualify or are produced wholly outside 
the trade area. These may erect temporary barriers to free trade between the trade area 
and the rest of the world. 
Because each nation has its own terms of trade, some simple and some exceedingly 
complex, it is difficult to collect all the terms of trade in a simple table. We have 
attempted to capture the more uniform tariffs and other terms of trade for all the countries 
in this study at the end of this Appendix. Also at the end of this Appendix, we include a 
more detailed listing of terms of trade for the 7 countries that we focus on in building the 
mathematical models. 
Tariffs 
Tariffs are applied as a percentage tax rate on the value of imported goods. Each country 
specifies how goods will be valued for this purpose. The most common valuation basis is 
called CIF (Cost, Insurance, and Freight), which means all the costs incurred in 
producing the goods and transporting them to the port of entry. Other valuation methods 
include FOB (Free on Board), which means all the costs of producing the goods and 
transporting them to the port of departure, including the cost of loading the vessel, but not 
ocean freight and ocean insurance. Declared value, based on competitive analysis, is used 
by only a few nations. 
Other Duties 
Many countries have in the past imposed special duties beyond the basic tariffs, 
sometimes to cover specific costs incurred in processing imports, but more often as 
additional hurdles to achieve various managed-economy objectives or to placate domestic 
interests. The automotive industry has been especially vulnerable to add-on duties 
reflecting national objectives to create an indigenous auto manufacturing and assembly 
industry and to restrict competition from import vehicles and components. 
Under GATT, many of these special duties have been or are being abolished. As a 
signatory to GATT, a country agrees to consolidate all its tariffs into a single rate for 
each product, eliminate non-tariff barriers, and adopt uniform and transparent rules 
governing tariffs. 
Nonetheless, some countries still maintain special port taxes. Of special interest in this 
study are the add-on duties in India. (See chart at the end of this appendix) 
Value-Added Taxes and Their Effect on Tariffs 
Value-added taxes (VAT) are widely used outside the United States as the preferred form 
of sales or consumption taxes. In a VAT system, at each tier of the production chain, the 
tax is applied to the total value of the output of that tier and becomes part of the price of 
the product being sold to the next tier of production. At each tier (firm), a rebate is given 
for the value-added tax included in all the input material purchased by the firm. The net 
VAT paid to the government by that firm represents only the VAT rate applied to the 
difference between its selling price and its material costs (its "value added," which is the 
firm's labor and profit). At the point of final sale, the seller collects the entire VA'T from 
the consumer. 
In some VAT countries, a single VAT rate is applied to all products, although there may 
be certain products (such as food or drugs) that are exempt from VAT. Some countries, 
however, have different rates for different products. 
Generally, VAT applies to all products, whatever their source, imported or domestic. 
Some special rules apply, however, to imports and exports. The exporting firm does not 
assess VAT on the exported product, but claims a rebate for all the VAT charged to it on 
its material purchases. It is often said this practice is how a VAT system stimulates 
exports. The importing firm, on the other hand, is liable for VAT on the total value of its 
imported purchases, including duties, other port taxes, and excise taxes and that drives up 
the taxable base of the import product. 
In this study, the cost of domestically produced parts is compared with the cost of 
imported parts. VAT is equivalent on the base cost of the two parts, but an imported part 
carries the burden on the incremental VAT assessed on the duty, other port taxes, and 
excise taxes, if any. The equations in this study are adjusted for this effect. 
Import Quotas and Licenses 
Import quotas are numerical limits imposed on the importation of products, usually 
without reference to country of origin. These are fairly common for built-up vehicle 
imports into less developed countries, but are relatively uncommon for components, 
except engines. Import quotas result generally from three motivations: a desire to reserve 
the national market for an infant local auto manufacturing and assembly industry; a belief 
that the national economy cannot afford the importation of goods viewed as luxuries (and 
the foreign exchange required to pay for them); and an intent to limit the environmental 
effects of large internal combustion engines. 
Trade Balancing and Foreign Exchange Requirements 
Some countries require importers to balance their imports with exports of comparable 
value. The requirements stem from job-protection or -creation motivations and from the 
desire to control foreign exchange outflows. In some instances, the requirement will state 
explicitly that the import of built-up vehicles must be offset by the export of locally 
manufactured parts. 
Mexico has historically had elaborate schemes of trade balancing and foreign exchange 
requirements, as well as import quotas and licenses, to protect its auto industry from U.S. 
domination. Under NAFTA, the requirements are continued, at diminishing levels, (luring 
a ten-year transition period (from 1994)' for goods meeting the North American Rule of 
Origin tests, but by 2004 these requirements go to zero, for the most part. They remain 
indefinitely for imports from non-NAFTA countries and any products not meeting the 
Rule of Origin requirement. 
Local Content Requirements 
Local content requirements may be imposed as an absolute requirement for import. or as 
a hurdle for qualifying for a preferential tariff rate. 
In any complex product, local content is built up in the various stages of production in 
multiple supplier tiers. The rules for what counts as local content can be compllex. In 
some cases, if a purchased component has more than 50% local content, the buyer of the 
component may count it as wholly locally produced when figuring the local content of 
the assembly that includes it. This is called "roll up." On the other hand, a component 
with less than 50% local content may count as nothing in the next tier's local content 
calculations. As a result, the final assembler or original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
generally makes local content calculations in its sourcing decisions. The OEM then tells 
the suppliers how much imported content it will tolerate in components it is purchasing. 
Needless to say, the sharing of cost data, broken down between locally produccd and 
imported parts, is a sensitive subject between buyers and sellers, and it is difficult for 
OEMs to collect precise data on local content. 
The implication for this study is that it is not possible to include local content as a general 
factor in the model, even though in real-life cases, local content rules for a country may 
affect the cost trade-offs. 
Restrictions of Foreign Investment and Controls on Profit Repatriation 
Some developing countries want to encourage foreign investment and some to discourage 
it, usually because their goal is to establish and protect locally owned manufacturing 
industry. In recent years, as globalization of the economy has proceeded, restrictions of 
foreign investment have diminished. The most common restrictions provide that foreign 
investors may not own controlling interest in the firms in which they invest; that is, they 
must have a local partner in their investment, and the local partner must maintain 
controlling equity. Controls on profit repatriation (dividend payments to foreign 
investors) usually stem from foreign exchange concerns and often limit foreign payouts 
to the amount of foreign exchange earned on export operations. 
Export and Foreign Investment Subsidies 
Countries eager to establish manufacturing industries, increase indigenous employment, 
and earn foreign exchange sometimes provide various export subsidies. These can take 
the form of direct incentive payments on exported goods, rebate of taxes paid in the 
production chain, low interest loans for plant and equipment acquisition, government 
guarantees on borrowing, holidays from property taxes on new plant investments, and 
partial relief from income taxes. 
In summary, the tariffs and duties discussion indicates that it is extremely difficult to 
account for all tariffs, duties, and any other added costs in the model, especially highly 
variable ones. We have made every attempt to use actual data or, where actual data was 
unavailable, reasonable estimates for the model. 
